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ABSTRACT

Such financial tools as share buybacks are coming under scrutiny by many investment
experts. Evidence suggests that share repurchases foster a short-term focus in corporate
managers who have a share-based compensation. Recent studies and research draw attention to
the negative consequences of corporate share repurchases. While share buybacks were
originally intended to create financial value for intrinsically undervalued shares, they are
increasingly coming under scrutiny for enabling shareholders to increase their value of wealth
at the expense of other stakeholders. With increased stock option plans for corporate executives,
the association between increase in open market share buyback activity and compensation may
not be a coincidence. Research shows, however, that open market share repurchases have
resulted in high stock prices in recent years that run contrary to negative fund flows. At the same
time, fundamental corporate growth strategies and fixed investments have not seen a significant
rise in activity. This paper measures the impact of corporate share repurchase activity on stock
market returns by analyzing broader market measures and industry returns.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. stock market experienced the longest bull market on record in the years that
followed the financial crisis in 2008-2009. Expansions are marked by such fundamental
indicators as economic growth, low unemployment and stable inflation. Expectations of strong
future profitability implied by these fundamentals attract investors and, as a consequence equity
fund flows should increase. With the introduction of exchange-traded fund (ETF) products,
however, implementation of share repurchases and corporate consolidation through mergers and
acquisitions, this expansion is different from what may be considered “natural” expansion.

Corporate share buyback activity has become progressively important for major U.S.
corporations to build shareholder wealth over the last decade (Stevens, 2019). The $3.8 trillion
worth of company stock repurchased in the previous nine years—ended 2018—exceeds the
cumulative investments from all other sources – (individuals, mutual funds, pension funds, and
foreign investors - combined). Although the volume of buybacks has exceeded cumulative
investments from all other sources, some scholars deem share repurchases as an ineffective tool.
Useem (2019) finds that stocks of companies engaged in high volume buybacks have performed
worse over the subsequent five years for shareholders than companies not engaged in the
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activity. The debate around the merits and shortcomings of corporate share buybacks and their
impact on stock market returns has escalated in recent months in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic and the consequences arising from the buyback activity for the last decade.

The recent COVID-19 pandemic has seen stay-at-home orders, suspension of major
events (for instance. 2020 Summer Olympics), and business shut downs that are slowing the
current expansion. This global public health crisis has exposed the negative implications of
aggressive buyback activity by some major corporations. Some major U.S. companies have
launched billion-dollar buyback programs in recent years, which has been a primary driver of
U.S. stock market performance. But in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak, the slowdown in
revenues and calls for government support may – “severely curtail”— repurchase activity
(Winck, 2020). As a result, market participants should expect wider trading ranges, less
downside support and slower earnings per share (EPS) growth (Constable, 2020).

More than likely, companies requesting government support could be required to stop
dividend and buyback programs as a consequence. Lastly, the market conditions following the
contraction of economic activity has the potential to be different to previous financial crises.
With share buybacks curtailed and cash flows slowing down, the subsequent rise in market
volatility and government restrictions may impact stock market returns.

Corporate operating performance and mutual fund flows are traditionally primary drivers
of stock performance, but in recent years’ corporate share buyback activity has become
increasingly prominent and influential in determining stock returns. As a result, this analysis
quantifies the influence of corporate share repurchases on broader market indexes and industry
stock returns.

Section II presents background information on share buybacks. Evidence from scholars is
presented in Section III. The empirical model is presented in Section IV. This Section is
segmented into Theoretical Model, Data, Model Results and Limitations. The conclusion is
presented in Section V.

II.

BACKGROUND

Before discussing the effects of corporate share buybacks, this section explores their
original intent. Prior to 1982, regulators considered share buybacks as market manipulation and
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were deemed illegal (Denning, 2018). Reducing the number of shares improves EPS
measurements. If the company’s reported EPS beats Wall Street estimates, this could provide an
artificial value for outside investors and coverage analysts. If analyst covering the company see
profitability improvement, they may enhance the stock price’s future outlook. In theory, outside
investors may be more willing to purchase shares of the company after reading analyst’s
coverage.

Lazonick (2014) states that with the passage of Rule 10b-18 of the Securities Exchange
Act in 1982, “a corporation’s board of directors can authorize senior executives to repurchase up
to a certain dollar amount of stock over a specified or open-ended period of time, and the
company must publicly announce the buyback program.” According to Alsin (2017), the original
intention of share repurchases are for companies that “truly have an undervalued stock, and using
excess cash to repurchase shares is actually a prudent, if not potent use of that shareholder cash.”
The application, however, has evolved for a variety of other purposes since the passage of the
rule.

Since 1982 share buyback activity by corporations has proliferated. Companies have the
option to buy shares directly from the marketplace or offer shareholders the option to tender
shares directly to the company (Banton, 2019). Managers of public corporations who generate
profit can retain these earnings for capital investments or they can distribute them to shareholders
in the form of dividends or share buybacks.

Corporate managers are motivated by a number of options in their choice. For share
buybacks in particular, “the net impact of a share repurchase is to reduce the number of
outstanding shares, which boosts the must-watched earnings-per-share metric even if overall net
income remains flat” (The Motley Fool, 2016). Although, companies may not actually be
growing profits, the EPS measurement for those companies that engage in share buybacks may
imply otherwise. For instance, Applied Materials had a 3.5 percent revenue decline in 2018, yet
the company managed to grow their earnings per share by 1.9 percent. (Useem, 2019)

The specificity of an “undervalued stock” is key when buybacks are measured in terms of
effectiveness. There is a degree of subjectivity in determining the intrinsic value of a stock and,
depending on a stock analysis and interpretation, the decision to repurchase shares can also be
regarded as subjective. Share buybacks incentivize short-term EPS growth for managers, while
also strengthening the company’s financial valuation for outside investors. The pressure on
short-term growth for company executives comes to the “expense of innovation, long-term
shareholder value, and the dynamism of the entire economy.” (Denning, 2018). Financial tools
can interfere with capital re-investment on such tangible products as research and development.
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Share buybacks interfere with conventional fixed investments and impede on corporate growth
leading to negative consequences in the economy.

With the legalization of corporate share repurchases, corporate executives have the
incentive to address shareholder needs by increasing share repurchasing activity. Stewart (2018)
finds that since the 1982 legislation, corporations have announced more than $9.9 trillion in
share buybacks in the past four decades and the volume of share buybacks has increased notably
in recent years. He further shows that since 2008, $5.6 trillion in share buybacks were announced
by public corporations. More than 50 percent of legalized share buybacks were announced in the
past decade alone. Corporate managers have been relying on share repurchases “rather than
creating fresh value and new customers through entrepreneurship and innovation”; they have
been “extracting value for shareholders (and themselves) by buying back their own shares.”
(Denning, 2018) This activity illustrates the impact of executive decisions at major companies in
the United States.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has reported that these executives are
abusing their managerial power to create their own wealth. According to an SEC analysis (2003),
in the eight days following a buyback announcement, corporate executives within the company
sold, on average, five times as much stock as they did on an ordinary day. While the ruling in
1982 may have changed the shareholder-manager relationship for the better, the misuse of the
buybacks highlights why share repurchases were first deemed illegal. Amended legislation
continues to show the unintentional consequences associated with share buybacks.

In 2003, the SEC amended the original Rule 10B-18. It simplified repurchases, requiring
that four conditions be met for share buybacks to be deemed legal, and introduced transparency
with issuer repurchases by requiring disclosure details on 10-Q, 10-K and 20-F (Securities and
Exchange Commission, 2003). The four conditions are: repurchase manner, repurchase timing,
prices paid and volume of shares.

President George W. Bush added a one-time tax program to the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, where corporations had the option to “repatriate” funds from overseas to the U.S. at
a reduced rate of 5.25 percent. These funds would “shovel that money back into the economy in
the form of investment and job creation” (Cox, 2017).

While the intention of the program was to grow capital re-investment through
corporations and provide all stakeholders with value growth, there were unintentional
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consequences. The results did not go as planned. Jilani (2017) cites a 2011 Senate study of 840
participating companies, the program brought $312 billion to the U.S. while the top 15
participating companies “reduced their total U.S. employment by 20,931 jobs … no evidence
existed that repatriated funds increased overall U.S. employment”. At the same time, the top five
executives’ compensation increased 27 percent from 2004 to 2005, while the “top 15 repatriating
corporations increased their spending on stock buybacks 16% from 2004 to 2005 and 38% from
2005 to 2006.” The sharp increase in stock buybacks put the repatriation program into question.
As jobs were being lost, executives were spending the repatriated cash on increased executive
compensation and share buybacks. Company executives have the ultimate power in deciding
how to spend the extra cash generated through profit. Since 2004, executives have demonstrated
that share buybacks are the most effective use of that cash. Between 2004 and 2013, 454
companies in the S&P 500 Index repurchased $3.4 trillion in stocks, “represent(ing) 51 percent
of net income.”

Large corporations have been increasingly engaging in share buybacks in recent years as
corporate tax cut policies have provided incentives to do so. This latest wave started in 2013 and
we can examine the growth in buybacks in the years since. Buybacks-to-free cash flow is a
financial metric that represents the percentage of free cash flow spent on share repurchases. In
2017, buybacks-to-free cash flow were 82 percent. Two years later in 2019, buybacks-to-free
cash flow was 104 percent. A double-digit percentage point increase in just two years is
significant growth in such a short time. Moreover, it was the first time that buybacks-to-free cash
flow had reached over 100 percent since 2009 (Cox, 2019). This indicates the speed at which
corporate managers are choosing to spend free cash on buybacks opposed to fixed, capital
investments.

The recent 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created a gap of wealth for American
corporations to distribute. After receiving a 14-point corporate tax rate deduction, executives
were advised to make fixed investment strategies and drive growth through new capital
investment projects benefitting all stakeholders. This corporate tax cut was intended to help
employees. Yet, a Bloomberg analysis cited by Stewart (2018) concluded that 60 percent of the
tax cut’s benefits will go to shareholders, whereas 15 percent will go to employees. Moreover, a
Morgan Stanley study also predicted that 43 percent of the tax cut gains were expected to go to
stock buybacks and dividends, while 13 percent would be distributed to employee benefits and
bonuses.

The Business Roundtable is a non-profit consortium of corporate CEO’s that promotes
public policy favorable to business interests. Their mission statement since 1997 states that “the
paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders.”
The duty of corporate managers, who have stock-option compensation is “maximizing profits”
for shareholders. According to Gelles and Yaffe-Bellany (2019), it can be inferred that some
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corporate managers are maximizing profits in their own interest and repurchasing stock to
increase their personal stock option value, because of the stock volume that managers possess. It
was notable then in 2019 when The Business Roundtable revised this mission statement that
corporations have a “fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders”, thus putting the
interests of employees, customers, suppliers and communities on par with shareholders.

The recent COVID-19 public health crisis has created new discussions about corporate
share buybacks, particularly about the federal stimulus packages to the airline industry. On
March 18, (Turvill, 2020) cited the Centre of Aviation belief that most of the world’s airlines
would be bankrupt by the end of May 2020 without government assistance. In response to the
possibility of the industry’s collapse and nearly 750,000 job losses, ten U.S. airlines will receive
a $25 billion bailout (Rappeport & Chokshi, 2020). The debate about whether or not taxpayers
should be responsible to help bailout these companies, centers on the increased share buyback
activity by major airline companies in recent years.

Although an airline industry bankruptcy could cost nearly 750,000 jobs, the four major
U.S. airlines (Delta, Southwest, United, American Airlines) have repurchased nearly $39.1
billion of company shares in the last four years (Turvill, 2020). In this same four-year period,
these four companies have laid-off 9,825 employees. Instead of retaining and hiring employees,
these companies used free cash flow to repurchase shares and make shareholders the only
beneficiaries. (Kochkodin, 2020) cites a Bloomberg report that between 2010 and 2019,
American Airlines, Delta, Southwest, Alaska and United Airlines spent nearly 96 percent of free
cash flow on share buybacks. This evidence provides basis for debate. If airlines were willing to
spend their profits on share buybacks instead of saving cash, would they have the ability to avoid
bankruptcy and weather this pandemic without government intervention?

Share buyback activity is not a contributing factor to economic growth, but recently it has
contributed to stock market growth. Scholars suggest that prior to 2000, share buyback programs
were an ethical approach to improve shareholder relationships. After tax legislation and
repatriation programs, however, companies have used their free market power to abuse share
repurchases. Whether the intent is to avoid corporate raiders or gain self-profitability,
repurchasing company shares has been standardized as a potential profitability enhancing
technique. The next section explores the academic research to determine how past corporate
share repurchase activity may have enhance stock market returns in recent decades.

III.

LITERATURE REVIEW
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Corporate share repurchases are complex in nature making it difficult to estimate their
effect on financial markets. Some of the important information includes artificial business
growth, overpriced open market offerings, labor market effects, tax policy incentives on firm
cash flow, and the impact from corporate raiders.

Company executives may decide to buyback equity from their firm for several reasons.
Some studies find that companies are motivated by informational signaling, free cash flow
disgorgement, dividend substitution, wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders, and
avoidance of the share dilution effect from employee stock options (Chen, Chen, & Wang,
2015). The decision in re-valuating a firm’s equity stake is unique and it becomes important that
all stakeholders, including employees, are considered.

The top-down decision for a company to repurchase shares has associated consequences.
Lazonick (2014) goes into the current discussions about income inequality and minimum wage
raises are being addressed ahead of the 2020 Presidential election with some candidates blaming
the sharp increase in share buyback activity. While this conclusion is difficult to draw, it is
suggested that the increased share buyback activity since the SEC ruling in 1982 has had an
impact on wages. Lazonick notes that “since the late 1970’s, average growth in real wages has
increasingly lagged productivity growth.” According to theory, increases in productivity leads to
higher wage growth. Alternative factors, like share buybacks, may explain why productivity has
outperformed wages for the past four decades. Corporate managers have been “managing” stock
prices through repurchases and the result is “trillion dollars that could have been spent on
innovation and job creation in the U.S. economy over the past three decades have instead been
used to buy back shares for what is effectively stock-price manipulation.” Instead of spending
cash on employee salaries or benefits, corporate executives have used profits to repurchase
company shares and satisfy shareholder demands. The evidence from Lazonick exemplifies the
reasoning to further analyze the impact from this corporate managerial behavior.

Although some critical literature drives the understanding that share buybacks may
illustrate an artificial sense of productivity to our capital markets, share repurchasing aligned
shareholder interests with the company. When share buybacks were legalized in 1982 by the
SEC, the intent was to establish a relationship between shareholders and managers. Shareholders
look to increase their investment’s wealth through management’s decision to distribute profits,
and share repurchases have many incentives for both parties.

After the SEC’s policy, successful and, experienced investors “recognized the value of
share buybacks in the right circumstances” (O'Shea & Worrall, 2005). Warren Buffett of
Berkshire Hathaway has maintained ethical investment decisions that benefit society and
corporate America. In his 1984 annual letter to shareholders, Buffett noted that repurchasing
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undervalued stock is “encouraging and rewarding” because they portray “actions that enhance
the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain.” Buffett
makes it clear to his shareholders that he has confidence in the way share buybacks could
transform how stockholders are rewarded. Two years following the SEC ruling change, Buffett
found that the benefits of share buybacks outweigh the costs. It needs to be noted, however, that
his statement only accounts for share buyback plans with undervalued stock prices.

According to Lazonick (2014), there are two types of share buybacks: tender offers and
open-market purchases. With tender offers, company officials reach out to shareholders and offer
to buy back their shares at a fixed price. It is this type of share repurchase offer that Buffett refers
to as “encouraging and rewarding” because it creates value for undervalued shares. Hence,
tender offers can be viewed as “good” share repurchases when, measured through long-term
outlook and valuation purposes. Open-market purchases are viewed as “bad” share repurchases.
Most open-market purchases are at overpriced levels and companies who partake, reduce the
stock value held by continuing shareholders. Lazonick cites a 1999 Berkshire Hathaway
shareholder letter where Warren Buffett writes that “the continuing shareholder is penalized by
repurchases above intrinsic value.”. After writing to shareholders in 1984 about the positive
impact on share buybacks, the market atmosphere surrounding buybacks had changed and
Buffett noticed this toxic environment. He also noted that “buying dollar bills for $1.10 is not
good business for those who stick around”. Here, Buffett is speaking about the corporate
decision to purchase shares on the open market and notes that these are overpriced for long-term
participants. There is a short-term outlook for open-market purchases and these quick incentives
for executives to increase their share value continued into the 21st century.

The tender share offers are meant for firms in need of equity capital looking to increase
shareholder value. Rule 10b-18 “legalized stock market manipulation through open-market
repurchases.” Open market repurchases are ruled as stock market manipulation if the company’s
purchases do not exceed 25 percent of the previous four weeks’ average daily trading volume.
The SEC typically enforces this ruling if they launch a special investigation on the respective
company. The law has created a gray area for companies and has allowed executives to bolster
share prices in the short-term. As this short-term decision can influence how companies continue
to operate, it is important to evaluate the research on the impact of share buybacks.

The decision in how managers spend their profits each quarter is a determinant of wealth
creation in both long and short-term for the firm. Hence it is important to understand the changes
that managers have made. According to Foroohar (2016), in the 1919 Dodge vs Ford Motor Co
case, the Dodge brothers, minority stakeholders in Ford, argued that they deserved share profits
in the form of dividends. Henry Ford argued that the firm should distribute those profits to
building more factories and selling more cars and noted that “my ambition is to employ still
more men, to spread the benefits of the industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help
them build up their lives and their homes.” He wanted to create value through tangible reinvestment in his firm and show his employees that growth was imminent. Not only did Ford
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create a unique automobile manufacturing process that changed the method of cars production,
but he also maintained his business ethics and insisted that his company would continue to grow
through stakeholder prioritization instead of shareholder profiting.

The priorities of management have changed since the Dodge vs Ford Motor Co case, and
“’shareholder value’ has become the rallying cry of many a financially oriented manager making
decisions that boost a company’s share price at the expense of longer-term growth” (Foroohar,
2016). In theory, the short-term financialization of profits would send a positive signal to outside
investors, driving demand for stock and raising the firm’s share price. The act of share
repurchases cater to outside investors in practice, however raises the possibility that the use of
insider information can drive unethical investing.

Some studies find there are labor power consequences associated with share repurchases
because of its impact on the company’s financial risk and profitability. Stock buybacks can
increase the risk of financial distress for the firm, leading to possible employee layoffs. These
repurchases also result in employees demanding higher wages, as the financial tool increases the
firm’s earnings growth. “If share repurchases motivate employees to demand more and become
tougher bargainers, firms facing strong labor power may not find it beneficial to repurchase”
(Chen, Chen, & Wang, 2015). Firm managers need to examine the cost of strengthened labor
power and include it as a factor in the cost-benefit analysis of repurchasing shares. Managers
who are misinformed or omit that variable could negatively impact the company and its financial
performance.

A prime example of this type of miscalculation was illustrated by Boeing’s management
in 2008 in their wage negotiations with the International Association of Machinists (IAM). The
IAM represents most of Boeing’s machinists and Boeing had proposed a wage growth of 11
percent. “After taking stock of Boeing’s record profits and its share buyback plan” the IAM
demanded a 13 percent wage increase (Chen, Chen, & Wang, 2015). The executives refused to
accept the proposal and Boeing’s machinists had a 58-day strike. Ultimately, this strike led to a
25 percent decline in quarterly revenues and an 80 percent decline in earnings during the same
quarter. This case exemplifies the potential repercussions of share buyback programs.

It is imperative to account for political influence in the evaluation of share repurchases by
major corporations and the impact that they have on the financial health of that company.
Fundamentally, the impact on a company’s net income will simultaneously impact a
shareholder’s return on equity. A rise in net income, increases EPS which increases the value of
each share in the company. The net income changes that represent the results from fundamental
operations in a firm can be measured through Earnings Before Interest & Taxes (EBIT). Not only
are competition and macroeconomic factors uncontrolled variables, but also the legislative tax
rate that impacts company profits. Unfavorable economic activity triggers political action to
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change the tax system. After his predecessor, President Jimmy Carter, called the tax code a “a
disgrace to the human race” President Ronald Reagan signed The Tax Reform Act of 1986
which lowered the corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent and resulted in increased profitability.
The cash remaining from profits could be distributed to shareholders directly via dividends, or
through re-investments. Regardless of tangibility (share repurchases vs. tangible re-investment),
this cash “distribution” turns into capital gains for shareholders. One study by Burman, Clausing,
and O’Hare in 1994, determined that long-term capital gains on corporate stock realized and
reported to tax authorities in December 1986 were seven times higher than reported in 1985
(Slemrod, 2018). Although this measurement represents short-term elasticity, it was notable for
capital re-investment purposes and business development.

With a large tax advantage in 1986, many corporations opted to repurchase share in the
years leading up to start of a new millennium. The “tech bubble” at the beginning of the century
made technology company public offerings obsolete because of weak profitability. The Bush
administration used a tax provision in the America Jobs Creation Act to allow U.S. corporations
to repatriate foreign earnings at a tax rate of 5.25 percent instead of the top 35 percent corporate
income tax rate. was incentivized to assist corporations and help expand the economy. The
intention was to increase domestic investments and create more jobs. Instead, evidence from
Levin & Coburn (2011) shows that increased cash flow activity was spent on stock repurchases
and executive compensation. How did the profits get here? After the legislation was enacted, 843
corporations repatriated $312 billion The top five companies to repatriate made up 28 percent of
total repatriations. The general result “for the 843 repatriating corporations as a whole, the
average amount repatriated was roughly $429 million, while the average qualifying dividend was
$370 million.” Transnational corporations took advantage of the tax cut on foreign profits to
repatriate cash back to the United States and used these funds to repurchase the firm’s shares.

After the 1982 SEC ruling and a tax reform by the Reagan administration four years later,
stock-based compensation became an important part of corporate governance. Lazonick (2014)
notes that the wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980’s was a “turning point” in the U.S. economy.
He writes that “corporate raiders” claimed that complacent leaders were failing to maximize
returns to shareholders, which resulted in corporate board of directors aligning the interests of
management and shareholders through higher allocation of stock-based pay in executive
compensation. Hedge fund managers with large investment pools, select large corporations with
the intention to influence executives on decisions that increases their capital gain.

Carl Icahn (2015), a well-known corporate raider, wrote a letter in 2012 to Apple’s CEO,
Tim Cook stating that although Apple had recently bought back $80 billion in shares, the shares
were still undervalued and they continued to maintain an increasing free cash position. Icahn
proposed that Cook should convince the board to help solve these issues by accelerating “share
repurchases in greater magnitude”. This example illustrates the type of behavior activist
investors can place on top executives. Icahn also noted that “Apple is very much a long term
growth story from our perspective” in his explanation behind why their shares should be trading
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at a premium instead of a discount. According to Baldwin (2018), Icahn earned a $2 billion
capital gain after holding Apple’s stock for 32 months. In essence, Icahn proposed a “long term
growth story” reasoning behind Apple’s share repurchases, only to support his short-term, highly
profitable and personal gain. After receiving Icahn’s letter, Tim Cook’s decision to repurchase
more Apple shares may have had personal wealth incentives attached. There could be a clear
association between stock-based compensation for corporate executives and an increase in share
buybacks. For instance, between 2003 and 2012 the top ten repurchasing firms spent $859 billion
on buybacks accounting for 68 percent of their combined net income (Lazonick, 2014). In the
same time period, the executives of these companies received $168 million each in
compensation, on average. Out of this compensation, stock options accounted for 34 percent and
stock awards 24 percent. These measures of executive compensation associated with buyback
activity, could put together an argument that executives campaigning for share repurchases are
selling the company’s wealth for their own, personal wealth.

Major corporations are launching billion-dollar share buyback programs to benefit
shareholders, executive compensation and corporate raiders. These companies are acquiring
shares from the open market and decreasing the market’s fund flows. Goetzmann and Massa
(1999) cite empirical evidence from Warther (1995) that returns and flows are strongly
contemporaneously correlated, based on finding no lagged relationship between market returns
and subsequent monthly net flows. Essentially, if fund flows are increasing and people are
investing, then stock returns will increase contemporaneously. In the case of share buybacks,
fund flows are decreasing, therefore stock returns should decrease simultaneously—in theory. As
the U.S. stock market has endured a bull market since the Financial Crisis in 2008-2009, there is
an inverse relationship between fund flows and stock returns. As the study by Warther was in
1995, the evidence may only apply to stock market returns before share buybacks were
prominent in the 21st century.

It is important to understand how this relationship has changed with new research that
includes increasingly protuberant share buyback activity. This paper extracts recent data
following new tax legislation, foreign repatriation, executive compensation increases and an
unprecedented decade-long bull run.

IV.

EMPIRICAL MODEL

Theoretical Background

Evidence from the literature finds that an increase in fund flow activity increases stock
market productivity. This relationship was relevant before 2000, and before buybacks became
increasingly relevant for companies. The increase in corporate share buyback activity since the
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start of the new millennium suggests that this activity has driven stock market profitability. To
find the stock market relationship between fund flows and share buybacks, we analyze available
data on buyback activity, fund flow activity and S&P 500 data from 1998.

Capital intensive industries make different investment activities to industries that require
less fixed investments. In analyzing share buybacks and other investment decisions, it is
important to segment the overall market into several industries, including Industrials, Consumer,
Energy, Healthcare and Technology. We analyze each sector by aggregating the common capital
allocation activities across leading companies in each industry as demonstrated by their
membership in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Common investment activities that major
corporations undertake include, capital expenditures (additions to property, plant and
equipment), share buybacks, and research and development. The calculation explains the free
cash flow investment decisions that executives make. The prominence of share buybacks is
explained by how much free cash flow was being spent on a company-to-company basis. Net
income is also examined in this context, as earnings play a key role in the valuation of companies
via the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.

It is important to understand the relationship between the stock market performance
across industries and the capital allocation decision and earnings performance. In theory, an
emphasis on capital expenditures (CAPEX) and research and development (R&D) should help
foster corporate growth. And the return on investments should help create profitability, thus
resulting in stock price appreciation. Aggregating industry share prices and capital investments,
including share buybacks, segments the stock market and explains how each industry is impacted
by these capital allocation decisions and profitability outcomes.

Data

Part 1

The first part of this study focuses on the broader stock market relationship between domestic
equity net fund flows and share buyback activity. Domestic equity net fund flows measure the
volume of institutional and retail investor funds that are flowing into or out of U.S. stocks at any
point in time. Domestic equity net fund flows are sourced from the Investment Company
Institute (ICI) from Long-Term Mutual Fund and ETF flows in the Domestic Equity – Combined
category in millions of dollars. Corporate share buybacks measure the dollar amount of
repurchases made quarterly by companies in the S&P 500 Index. Buyback data was sourced
from S&P Dow Jones Indices in billions of dollars. The stock market return data was calculated
through the S&P 500 Index and are sourced from the Yahoo Finance database.
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Part 1 Models & Results

Model 1: Mutual Fund and ETF Flows and Share Buybacks
Model 1 includes two variables to explain the S&P 500 index — corporate share buybacks, and
domestic equity net fund flows. The model focuses on the post financial crisis period from 2010
and 2019 where both buyback and fund flow data are readily available. This period is notable in
that it encompasses nearly the entire period when stock prices appreciated considerably in the
aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009.

Theoretical Model

𝑆𝑃𝑋 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 + 𝜖

Expected signs

Based on the literature provided, we expect Fund Flows (+) to have a positive relationship with
the S&P 500 Index. Based on our hypothesis, we expect Buybacks (+) to have a positive
relationship with the S&P 500 Index, but expect the relationship to be less significant than Fund
Flows.

Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.8359
R Square
0.6987
Adjusted R Square
0.6824
Standard Error
340.4472
Observations
40
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Intercept
Buybacks
Flows

Coefficients Standard Error
260.9098
195.8060
12.9476
1.4524
-0.5194
1.7498
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t Stat
1.3325
8.9144
-0.2969

P-value
0.1908
0.0000
0.7682

The results of Model 1 show the relationship between the S&P 500 Index and fund flow activity
and share buyback activity. Generally, the explanatory power of the model is strong with a
0.6824 Adjusted R-Square. The coefficient on Buybacks is statistically significant with a tstatistic of 8.9144. This model implies that share buybacks not only explain historical S&P 500
market returns, but also that the explanation is highly significant. Fund flow activity is not
significant and the negative coefficient is contrary to the expected hypothesis. Contrary to
literature before 2000, this model provides evidence that between 2010 and 2019 fund flows is
not a meaningful explanatory variable in stock market returns. Just as notable is the prominence
in share buyback activity, which have significantly contributed to stock market returns.

Model 2: Share Buybacks

Model 2 explains the relationship between share buybacks and stock market returns from 1998 to
February, 2019. It only includes the S&P 500 Index and Share Buybacks data because of data
restrictions from the fund flow statistics. On the other hand, this model allows for a larger sample
size.

Theoretical Model

𝑆𝑃𝑋 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

Based on literature and our hypothesis, we should expect Buybacks (+) to be positively
correlated with the S&P 500 Index, with no other control variables included

Results
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Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.8249
R Square
0.6804
Adjusted R Square
0.6767
Standard Error
331.5496
Observations
88

Intercept
Buybacks

Coefficients
Standard Error
710.5979
71.4180
9.0681
0.6702

t Stat
9.9498
13.5307

P-value
0.0000
0.0000

The results of Model 2 show corporate share buybacks over a longer time from 1998. Generally,
the explanatory power of the model is strong with an Adjusted R-Square of 0.6767. Not only are
Buybacks positively correlated with stock market returns, but they are also statistically
significant with a t-statistic of 13.5307. It is clear that buybacks are prominent in explaining the
S&P 500 index over time.

Model 3: Mutual Fund and ETF Flows

Model 3 only includes the fund flows data to explain market returns as measured by the S&P 500
Index. Due to data availability, these data are limited from 2010 to 2019.

Theoretical Model

𝑆𝑃𝑋 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

Based on literature, we expect the relationship between Fund Flows (+) and the S&P 500 Index
returns to be highly significant.
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Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.2270
R Square
0.0515
Adjusted R Square
0.0266
Standard Error
596.0151
Observations
40
Intercept
Flows

Coefficients Standard Error
1928.9132
100.9989
-4.2723
2.9734

t Stat
19.0984
-1.4369

P-value
0.0000
0.1589

The results of Model 3 show that the model has poor explanatory power with an Adjusted RSquare of 0.0266. The model shows that the association between domestic equity net mutual
fund and ETF flows are not significant and the correlation with the S&P 500 Index is negative.
This model is not what would have been reasonably expected in our hypothesis, based on
literature that showed that fund flows are positively correlated with stock market returns up until
the start of the new millennium.

Part 2

In the second part of our empirical model, we break down the broad market into five
industries: Industrials, Consumers, Energy, Healthcare, and Technology. For each industry, the
analysis uses available data from 1991 to 2019. Each model is an industry breakdown. This
analysis uses capital expenditures (CAPEX), net income, buybacks and research and
development (R&D). The financial data are sourced from Mergent Online. The stock price data
are retrieved and downloaded from Yahoo Finance. Each source is compiled and organized,
company by company, aggregated and indexed into the five industries listed above.

The analysis uses the financial statements of Dow 30 companies from 1982. Due to the
lack of availability for some of the data, the analysis starts in 1991 and ends in 2019. Also,
companies in the Financials sector, such as American Express, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan
Chase, and Traveler’s were not included in the sample. This exclusion is due to limiting outlier
data based on the balance sheet structure and investment activity that financial institutions have
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in place. The analysis also excludes Dow and Walgreens because recent merger activity for these
two companies does not provide continuity in the historical financial data.

The sample includes 22 companies in the DOW 30 Industrial, segmented into the following
industries:
Industrials: 3M, United Technologies, Boeing, CAT
Consumers: Coca-Cola, Disney, Home Depot, McDonald’s, Nike, Walmart
Energy: Chevron, Exxon Mobil
Healthcare: Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, United Health
Technology: Apple, Cisco, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Verizon

Part 2 Models & Results

Model 4: Industrials

Model 4 explores the performance of stock prices for the industrial sector with respect to
CAPEX, Net Income and Buybacks. The analysis aggregates share prices of four companies:
3M, United Technologies, Boeing and CAT. It also combines these companies’ capital
expenditures, net incomes and share buybacks of these companies from 1991 to 2019.

Theoretical Model

𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

For the industrial sector, we expect CAPEX (+) and Net Income (+) to be the most significant
variable in determining the stock price of the industrial sector. While we expect Buybacks (+) to
be significant, it is not expected to be as significant as CAPEX and Net Income.

Results
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Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.9551
R Square
0.9122
Adjusted R Square
0.9016
Standard Error
826.7419
Observations
29
Intercept
CAPEX
Net Income
Buybacks

Coefficients Standard Error
-567.2842
578.2698
0.1845
0.1673
0.0415
0.0539
0.1148
0.0166

t Stat
-0.9810
1.1029
0.7700
6.9192

P-value
0.3360
0.2806
0.4485
0.0000

The results of Model 4 present aggregate data of capital expenditures, net income and buybacks
within the Industrials sector of the Dow 30. Overall, the explanatory power of the model is
strong with an Adjusted R-squared of 0.9016. All three independent variables have a positive
correlation with the industrial sector price index. But only corporate share buybacks (Buybacks)
are statistically significant with a t-statistic of 6.9192. Thus, buybacks were a primary and
significant driver of stock market returns in the Industrials sector over the past three decades.

Model 5: Consumer

Model 5 explores the performance of stock prices in the Consumers industry with respect to
CAPEX, Net Income and Buybacks. The analysis aggregates share prices of six included
companies: Coca-Cola, Disney, Home Depot, McDonald’s, Nike and Walmart. It also combines
the capital expenditures, net incomes and share buybacks of these companies from 1991 to 2019.

Theoretical Model

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝜖

Expected Signs
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For the Consumers industry we expect CAPEX (+) and Buybacks (+) to be significant
explanatory variables. Because of the cyclical industry, however, we expect Net Income to have
a higher significance in determining the industry’s overall share price index.

Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.9611
R Square
0.9236
Adjusted R Square
0.9145
Standard Error
4075.4647
Observations
29.0000

Intercept
CAPEX
Net Income
Buybacks

Coefficients Standard Error
2447.6312
2308.1725
-0.6999
0.2501
-0.1194
0.1942
0.4434
0.0558

t Stat
P-value
1.0604
0.2991
-2.7989
0.0097
-0.6150
0.5441
7.9474
0.0000

The results of Model 5 presents aggregate data of capital expenditures, net income and buybacks
within the Consumer sector of the Dow 30. The explanatory power of the model is strong with an
Adjusted R-square of 0.9145. Share buybacks (Buybacks) have a positive correlation with the
industry’s returns and are statistically significant with a t-statistic of 7.9474. Contrary to our
hypothesis, CAPEX is statistically significant, but with a negative coefficient that is
counterintuitive. This can be interpreted that CAPEX has a negative impact on share prices.

Model 6: Energy

Model 6 explores the Energy’s industry stock price performance with respect to CAPEX, Net
Income, Buybacks, and R&D. The analysis aggregates share prices of two included companies:
Chevron and Exxon Mobil. It also combines these companies’ capital expenditures, net incomes,
share buybacks and research and development of these two companies from 1991 to 2019.
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Theoretical Model

𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

Because of the nature of the Energy sector, we expect that CAPEX (+) and R&D (+) would be
positively correlated with the price index of the sector. We also expect Net Income (+) and
Buybacks (+) to show positive correlations, but to be less significant than what we expect from
CAPEX and R&D.

Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.9586
R Square
0.9190
Adjusted R Square
0.9055
Standard Error
402.3191
Observations
29.0000

Intercept
CAPEX
Net Income
Buybacks
R&D

Coefficients Standard Error
205.0756
250.8160
-0.0167
0.0128
0.0115
0.0051
0.0130
0.0019
0.2296
0.2196

t Stat
P-value
0.8176
0.4216
-1.2976
0.2068
2.2452
0.0342
6.9432
0.0000
1.0457
0.3061

The results of Model 6 show aggregate data of capital expenditures, net income, buybacks and
research and development within the Energy sector of the Dow 30. With an Adjusted R-squared
of 0.9055, the explanatory power of this model is strong. Three independent variables, Net
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Income, Buybacks and R&D, have a positive correlation with the energy sector price index. Only
Net Income and Buybacks, however are statistically significant with t-statistics of 2.2452 and
6.9432, respectively. These results indicate that buybacks mostly explain stock price
performance in the energy industry. Furthermore, the results support the hypothesis that
corporate share repurchase activity have been driving Energy stock prices.

Model 7: Healthcare

Model 7 explores the performance of stock prices in the Healthcare industry with respect to
CAPEX, Net Income, Buybacks, and R&D. The analysis aggregates share prices of four
included companies: Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, United Health. It also combines the
capital expenditures, net income, share buybacks and research and development of these four
companies from 1991 to 2019.

Theoretical Model

𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

We expect all four variables to be positively correlated with the dependent variable, healthcare:
that R&D (+) CAPEX (+), Net Income (+), and Buybacks (+). Given the nature of the healthcare
industry we expect R&D (+) would be the most significant explanatory variable in the model.

Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.9299
R Square
0.8647
Adjusted R Square
0.8421
Standard Error
1813.8911
Observations
29.0000
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Intercept
CAPEX
Net Income
Buybacks
R&D

Coefficients Standard Error
-220.0182
1027.4823
0.4641
0.2154
-0.1282
0.0751
0.0917
0.0242
0.0201
0.1210
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t Stat
P-value
-0.2141
0.8323
2.1547
0.0414
-1.7066
0.1008
3.7900
0.0009
0.1657
0.8698

The results of Model 7 presents aggregate data of capital expenditures, net income, buybacks and
research and development within the Healthcare sector of the Dow 30. The explanatory power of
the model is strong with an Adjusted R-squared of 0.8421. While the independent variables,
CAPEX, Buybacks and R&D have a positive correlation with the Healthcare sector price index,
only CAPEX and Buybacks are statistically significant, with a t-statistics of 2.1547 and 3.7900,
respectively. Notably, R&D is not statistically significant in explaining the stock price
performance of the healthcare sector. The negative correlation of Net Income counterintuitive,
but the variable is not statistically significant. Overall, Buybacks is the most statistically
significant variable in this model, indicating that buyback activity is driving the stock prices of
Healthcare companies.

Model 8: Technology

Model 8 examines the Technology’s industry stock price performance with respect to CAPEX,
Net Income, Buybacks, and R&D. The analysis aggregates share prices of five included
companies: Apple, Cisco, IBM, Intel, Microsoft. It also combines capital expenditures, net
incomes, share buybacks and research and development in the five companies from 1991 to
2019.

Theoretical Model

𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 + 𝜖

Expected Signs

All four independent variables are expected to show a positive correlation with the independent
variable, technology: CAPEX (+), Net Income (+), Buybacks (+), and R&D (+). We expect,
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however, that R&D (+) and Buybacks (+) would be the more significant variables in the model
because of the low intensity in fixed capital and continued innovation throughout the industry.
We expect that CAPEX (+) and Net Income (+) would have positive correlations, but less
explanatory than R&D and Buybacks.

Results

Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.8744
R Square
0.7646
Adjusted R Square
0.7253
Standard Error
1736.8980
Observations
29.0000
Intercept
CAPEX
Net Income
Buybacks
R&D

Coefficients Standard Error
-1390.1246
1606.8437
-0.0069
0.1043
-0.0116
0.0347
-0.0066
0.0268
0.2684
0.2213

t Stat
P-value
-0.8651
0.3955
-0.0659
0.9480
-0.3333
0.7418
-0.2467
0.8072
1.2131
0.2369

The results of Model 8 show aggregate data of capital expenditures, net income, buybacks and
research and development within the Technology sector of the Dow 30. The explanatory power
of the model is strong with an Adjusted R-squared of 0.7253. Except for R&D, the independent
variables have a negative correlation with the price index of the technology sector. On the other
hand, none of these variables are statistically significant in determining technology share prices.

Summary of Results

The results of these various models support the hypothesis that corporate share buyback
activity over the past three decades has driven stock prices within the broader market and many
of its underlying sectors. Moreover, some areas of the market are not exhibiting the same
association between corporate share buyback activity and stock prices.
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The results in each part of this analysis, however, have limitations that merit discussion.
In the first part of modeling, data availability for all years is lacking. While buybacks data goes
back to 1998, the domestic equity net mutual fund and ETF flows data only goes back to 2010.
In Model 1, the combination of fund flows and buybacks only goes back to 2010. This relatively
limited time frame could lead to an incorrect conclusion of correlation and significance between
the independent and dependent variables.

In part 2, there are also some limitations in several parts. This analysis contains some of
the largest U.S. companies found in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. If this analysis were to
include a broader range of companies such as those found in the S&P 500 Index, then sample
size would be larger and it is possible that the results could be different. In Models 4 (Industrials)
and 5 (Consumers), we also exclude research and development (R&D). Most companies in these
sectors do not list R&D as an expense of their Income Statement. An examination of the separate
models for each industry may show skewed results for the Energy, Healthcare and Technology
sectors. In adding another independent variable, the remaining variables’ relationships may have
different relationships.

We focus on large transnational companies because our research finds evidence that these
companies are strong indicators for the U.S. stock market’s returns. If our analysis had included
small-cap U.S. companies, where share buybacks are less prevalent, then the results could be
different and we would draw different conclusions.

V.

CONCLUSION

The recent increase in corporate share buyback activity has been influential in stock
market performance. Evidence from the literature suggests that such traditional financial
indicators as domestic equity net fund flows, are positively correlated with stock market returns.
The empirical evidence in this paper, however, vindicates that not only are corporate share
repurchases statistically significant in explaining S&P 500 returns, but also that domestic equity
fund flows no longer have a positive relationship.

The empirical models in Part I of the analysis find that domestic equity fund flows are not
statistically significant in determining S&P 500 returns. Prior to 2000, the literature did find
evidence for this relationship. The recent prominence is share repurchases, however, questions
the relationship between domestic equity fund flows and S&P 500 stock performance. Empirical
evidence in Part I finds that corporate share buybacks are statistically significant in explaining
S&P 500 returns.
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The empirical model in Part II of the analysis use aggregated data from five major
industries to find relationships between share price indices and capital allocations. Four of the
models—Industrials, Consumers, Energy, Healthcare industries—confirm a positive relationship
and statistically significant relationship between buyback activity and the share price index in
these industries. For Industrials and Consumers industries, share buybacks are more indicative of
stock returns than net income and capital expenditures. Buybacks are more suggesting than net
income, capital expenditures, and research and development in Energy and Healthcare industries.
Net income, capital expenditures and research and development are traditional indicators in
explaining corporate earnings and stock prices. Evidence from this empirical model in this paper,
however, confirm the significance of share buybacks in industry index returns.

Although corporate share buybacks have a fundamental purpose in increasing the price
undervalued stocks, major corporations have increased share buyback plans to record levels in
the past decade. With evidence that these buyback plans explain S&P 500 market returns, should
the SEC impose share buyback plan limitations on corporations?

In light of the recent federal bailouts for the airlines industry, airline companies may not
have required federal stimulus if the SEC had imposed buyback plan restrictions. Although no
one expected the COVID-19 pandemic, companies should be responsible in adapting to a
contraction in economic activity, and possibly, a recession. Instead of being more responsible,
major corporations are relying on taxpayer money to save their own entity from bankruptcy. A
change in policy is the necessary solution.

The SEC should consider taking an aggressive approach in changing corporate share
repurchase policy. Companies partaking in corporate share buyback activity would have
limitations placed on the number of shares that could be repurchased. The SEC should also
consider restricting companies from open market repurchases, where shares are being bought at
overvalued prices. Penalties imposed on corporations to repurchase shares will then incentivize
companies to allocate free cash flow towards capital expenditures, research and development and
employee wages. With evidence that corporate share buyback activity is explaining stock market
returns, disincentives will help limit this relationship. Stock market returns can revert to the
traditional explanation of being driven by such fundamental indicators as domestic equity fund
flows. A return to business fundamentals will provide a more natural stock market and limit
federal bailouts that use taxpayer money.
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